POINT OF DEPARTURE
There is an ongoing debate on whether disasters cause significant macroeconomic impacts and are truly a potential impediment to development. A position backed by anecdotal evidence and a fair number of studies holds that natural disasters can set back economic development (Otero and Marti, 1995; Benson, 1997a,b,c; Benson and Clay, 1998 ECLAC, 1999 ECLAC, , 2002 Murlidharan and Shah, 2001; Crowards, 2000; Charveriat, 2000; Mechler, 2004; Hochrainer, 2006; Cuaresma et al., 2008; Noy, 2009) .
Then, there is a position suggesting that disasters have no effects on economic growth (Albala-Bertrand, 1993 Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Caselli and Malhotra, 2004) .
Most analyses along these lines have focused on aggregate impacts, and here on GDP as the standard economic indicator for measuring changes in economic welfare. There is almost no work on other indicators of welfare, such as consumption, which in economics is usually taken as the basis for assessing changes in individual utility and social welfare. Furthermore, it is well known that GDP or GNI 2 are imperfect metrics for measuring changes in welfare, as those aggregates generally do not account for the depletion of natural resources, the value of household labor or investments into education. Several alternative concepts have been proposed, an important one being genuine savings, 3 which is an alternative welfare indicator based on concepts of green accounting (see, e.g., Hamilton and Atkinson, 2006) . Genuine savings aims at better measuring the "true" national savings by adding investments in human capital and subtracting for the consumption of capital stock, the depletion of natural resources and the adverse effects of air pollution. The validity of savings measures is commonly tested by studying their ability to explain variations in consumption changes. Although fraught with measurement problems, genuine savings has gained acceptance and found applications in research and policy. It is also standardly reported in the World Bank World Development Indicators.
In the context of natural disaster risk, an additional problem arises due to the fact that the destruction of assets (capital stocks) is not considered in national accounting (which essentially measures flows only), while the flow variables reconstruction and relief spending add positively to GDP, yet in fact only contribute to a recovery to a prior 3 economic status quo. Thus, relief and reconstruction spending in fact have to be considered as a kind of "defensive spending," and consequently disaster losses may need to be adjusted for in national accounting statistics.
Given that disasters deplete capital stock and can be important in many countries, in this paper we examine and test whether disasters losses should also be appropriately considered in genuine savings and other savings measures. 4 Almost no work has been done on this issue. One paper, Barrito (2008) , mentions this potential problem and suggests a way for revising wealth accounting, yet does not empirically test it.
Using a sample of large disaster losses over the 30 year period from 1971 to 2000, we examine whether factoring in such disaster shocks may help to better explain future variations in welfare as measured by private and public consumption expenditure. Overall we find some, albeit small and limited, evidence for adverse consequences of disasters on consumption. Focusing on alternative measures of welfare and assessing the contribution of disaster-related asset losses to changes in consumption we conclude that accounting for disaster asset losses for disaster-exposed, low income countries may help to better explain variations in post-disaster consumption and thus adjusting alternative welfare indicators (negatively) can lead to improved predictability of future post-disaster consumption changes.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in section 2 with introducing the concept of national savings and a proposal for deriving alternative savings measures. We further suggest to consider disaster losses in savings measures and use a method to test the suitability of doing so. In section 3, we present results based on cross-country regressions for a sample of large scale disasters. Section 4 ends with a discussion of these findings and implications of the analysis. 4 There may also be an anticipatory effect as individuals adjust their savings and consumption decisions before or without an event, and thus baseline savings already incorporate part of the response to an event. Yet, generally, the literature finds people to be myopic faced with rare events such as disasters, and thus this effect may mostly be important in areas with frequent events, which are not considered in this dataset examining the largest 200 plus events over the last three decades.
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USING AND APPLYING SAVINGS TO EXPLAIN CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION
In standard national accounting, gross national savings is calculated as the residual of income and consumption. Gross savings is the amount of annual gross income that is not consumed, and thus can be used for investment finally which adds to national wealth.
Positive savings indicate an increment to overall national wealth. Standardly, national accounting only measures the increments to produced capital (or capital stock consisting of machinery, equipment, physical structures including infrastructure, and urban land area), yet social capital (human capital, quality of institutions, and the governance of goods and people) and environmental capital (land, forests and sub-soil resources) are not considered. Alternative savings measures have been proposed in order to also factor in investments in those capital classes, a key concept being that of genuine savings. Genuine savings can be derived from gross national savings, which is standardly reported in national accounting statistics, and four types of adjustments can be distinguished as suggested in World Bank (2006) as follows (see also figure 1):
(1) The depreciation of fixed capital representing the consumption of capital is deducted from gross savings leading to net savings.
(2) Current education expenditures representing investments in human capital (standardly, in national accounting these expenditures are considered a consumption item) 5 are added in order to obtain net savings plus education expenditure.
(3) The depletion of natural resources is factored in reflecting the decrease in the natural asset base due to the extraction and harvesting of resources leading to genuine savings excluding air and climate change damages.
(4) In a final step, social costs due to air pollution and climate change may be subtracted leading to an estimate of genuine savings including air and climate change damages.
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Testing the explanatory power of savings
In order to test whether different savings concepts may indeed lead to an improved explanation of welfare changes, savings may be linked to consumption (see Dasgupta, 2001; Hamilton and Hartwick, 2005) . In a competitive economy savings S (the increment to capital or wealth) in a given year t o should equal the present value of changes in consumption ever after t o , i.e., the future additional consumption produced thanks to the wealth increment. In equation form this can be expressed as follows:
with S, the savings measure, C consumption, N population, r discount rate, t time, and T end of the time horizon considered. Accordingly, this relationship may be tested empirically in a linear relationship as follows:
with PVC to +1,T the present value of the change in per capita consumption from year t o +1 to T, and S the respective savings measure in t 0 , and V a n u a t u 1 9 8 5 S t . K it t s a n d N e v is 1 9 9 8 V a n u a t u Although only a part of these losses are in fact capital stock losses, it seems evident that losing a substantial portion of produced assets will impact the capital accumulation process, affect produced wealth and as a consequence impair income creation. Barrito (2008) suggests that, if factoring in reported disaster losses as the stock losses, capital accumulation may fall significantly and permanently short of regularly reported increments to capital (see Figure 3) . Consequently, capital accumulation in vulnerable countries such as El Salvador, Fiji and St. Lucia may be strongly affected by one or multiple events whereas in large and diversified economies no significant effect may be identified.
Given a lower capital accumulation path, it is straightforward to expect adverse welfare effects, such as changes in consumption and consumption volatility over time.
The key question we pursue in this paper is to assess whether natural disaster losses can be considered to affect consumption and whether including them in savings measures may help to improve the predictive power of savings constructs. Our entry point is to adjust for disasters by adding the disaster related depreciation in terms of losses of capital stock to the other regular depreciation of capital. depletion. 7 We use this savings measure and further adjust it by subtracting disaster asset losses in the given event, and in order to compare also examine gross and net savings, overall leading to three disaster adjusted savings indicators: (i) gross disaster savings, (ii) net disaster savings, and (iii) genuine disaster savings. We compare these constructs to the savings measures unadjusted for disaster losses. The intuition behind the adjustment is to include the adjustment of capital stock losses resulting from an exogenous disaster shock. In line with World Bank (2006), we conduct standard bivariate regression and do not simultaneously account for other explanatory variables beyond savings measures.
Yet, we compose subsamples, such as differentiated by country income groups.
Data and estimation procedure
The analysis is based on observed and calculated savings and the present value of nature; these are mostly droughts, extreme temperature events and forest fires. Table 1 classifies the events in our sample according to cause and type of event. Loss data may refer to direct and indirect loss, or stocks and flows, in unknown proportions. As for our analysis only the direct stock losses are of importance, we resort to assumptions and refer to evidence on the share of the direct capital stock losses in productive sectors and infrastructure in different events in Latin America, for which good information was at hand. Based on information listed on Table 2 and Table I -2 in the Appendix for which a simple average would amount to 33%, given uncertainty around 11 this parameter, we finally take the simplifying assumption of using a share of 35% stock losses in reported total losses. We restrict our analysis to events as late as the year 2000, so that a minimum of 5 years of consumption data can still be used. As discussed in Ferreira, Hamilton, and Vincent (2008) , green accounting theory refers to an infinite time horizon, and it has been shown that results become more valid with a longer time horizon; other studies have used a minimum of 10 years, with a preference for 20 years. In contrast, we use a minimum of 5
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years, yet in order to maintain a large number of observations, we keep the time horizon flexible from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 33 years of consumption changes observed. We do find this flexibility in terms of time horizon to adversely affect the analysis, which we discuss in the following. Given the data and adjustments done and a lack of net and genuine savings data for a number of countries, only 99 observations remained. Importantly, many of the low income countries with massive losses (such as the biggest event of St. Lucia in 1988) dropped out due to a lack of savings or consumption data, which is a constraint of the analysis to keep in mind. Table 4 quantitatively describes the key variables used for the analysis. Losses exhibit a wide range from 1% to 57% of GNI per capita of the year of the event.
The means of the (non-disaster adjusted) savings variables seem broadly of similar magnitude as the present value of consumption changes with means of 0.17, 0.08 and 0.07 of GNI as compared to the average consumption change of 0.18% of GNI per capita.
The "disaster" adjustment to the savings indicators reduces the means and increases variability as measured by the standard deviation. To provide an idea for the distribution behind the summary statistics reported in Table 4 , Figure 4 shows gross savings and gross disaster savings across the 99 cases. We observe that in the majority of cases 13 adjustments are small to moderate with a few very large events leading to severe disasterrelated dissavings. A key issue to also consider is the effect of aid (and aid volatility) on consumption. The question whether aid leads to higher investments (and thus to higher consumption in the future), or is simply consumed, is of course at the heart of the development discourse and there is no overall consensus (see, e.g. Arellano et al, 2009 ). This issue seems particularly important for our analysis, as generally in large scale disasters additional aid in terms of relief and reconstruction assistance is received. For example, in earlier work (Freeman et al., 2002) , based on a regression analysis of large scale disaster events, we find that about 10% of losses in larger events will be compensated for by relief and reconstruction assistance. In order to revise for this "muddying" effect of international aid, particularly for the case of lower income countries, we also calculate scenarios, where we subtract aid from consumption. In order to generally illustrate the calculation procedure, below we outline the case of Honduras, which experienced four large events (1974, 1982, 1990 and 1998) over the time horizon of our study. 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In Honduras, we observe multiple events leading to total and capital stock losses; beyond the ones we look at in our sample with the 1% threshold, there are another 35 events of smaller magnitude over the time horizon studied listed in the EMDAT database. Disasters seem to have led to decreases in consumption spending in the year of and following events (also depending on whether catastrophes happened early or late in a given year).
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Aid seemingly has had a smoothing effect, and consumption generally exhibited some volatility due to other reasons (for example, the hyperinflation in the 1990s). The chart also shows the varying time horizons adopted in this study for examining effects on consumption changes over time.
FINDINGS
For our sample of 99 events we start out with assessing whether asset losses can be said to affect the present value of post-disaster consumption changes. As shown on Table 5 for the whole sample and for two further samples for which we report results further below, all hydrometeorological events and hydrometeorological events in the low income group of countries, the loss is highly insignificant (this is also the case for all further regressions undertaken), and the (nonstandardized) coefficient is positive, which is 15
counterintuitive, yet may be explained by the fact that there are many other perturbations affecting consumption positively as well as negatively, and thus the loss alone might have little effect on future consumption. The savings variables are all significant and most of the constants similarly so. Further, for the whole sample, the size of these values is in line with findings from other studies with about 13%, 10%, and 9% of the consumption change explained by gross, net and genuine savings measures respectively in the baseline year. To provide some perspective, Also, constants become unimportant and genuine savings very significant at the 1% level.
We suggest to keep this limitation in mind, yet in order to assess interesting subsamples in the following, we propose to continue working with the variable time horizon given our small dataset of 99 observations only. Accordingly, the analysis should not be understood as shedding more light on the debate whether genuine savings better explain consumption changes, but rather whether disaster "depreciation" helps improve the explanatory power of savings measures generally. Yet, overall, deducting disasters does not improve the explained variation, and R squares actually decrease slightly for both specifications and all savings measures, so, for the sample looking at all hazard types and income classes we do not find disaster depreciation to better explain regressions.
We now further test different subsamples, such as for sudden, slow onset and sudden hydrometeorological events separately. As can be seen on Table II-1 in the Appendix, the sudden onset group had similar explanatory power in terms of R squares as the whole dataset, while for genuine savings the R square measure as indicator of the explained variation now actually slightly improved when introducing disaster losses.
Then, as shown on Table II-2 for the slow-onset events (while probably too small for   17 robust results with only 21 observations), all variables become insignificant indicating that indeed slow onset events may largely lead to indirect, flow losses rather than to direct, stock impacts to be explained by savings measures. As a next sample, suddenonset, hydrometeorological events (storms and floods) are examined leading to the strongest results in terms of R squares (from 0.33 to 0.19), while also the disaster adjustment decreases the quality of the regression. A factor explaining this difference in results is clearly that most of the earthquakes (13 out of 15) in the sample occurred in high and medium income countries, while many low income countries in the sample are prone to massive flooding and storms (hurricanes). Thus it seems to be income, further discussed below, which picks up most of the explained variation. We feel not confident going beyond this in trying to explain the variation by the types of sudden onset events.
Overall, we find for the sample undifferentiated by per capita income that revising savings for disaster shocks does not reliably improve regression results in terms of better explaining post-disaster consumption variation.
Low and middle income sample
As a next step, we further divide the sample into country groups differentiated by per capita income with the expectation that the explanatory power of savings may increase as we zoom into the group of medium to low income countries, where capital stock should become more important.
14,15 Generally, work on genuine savings has contended that in non-industrialized countries produced capital due to its sheer scarcity is a more important component of wealth than in higher income countries, where human capital seems more critical (see, e.g., Ferreira et al., 2008) . Also, as discussed above, for this group of less industrialized countries, aid inflows play an important role, and we further test the effect of subtracting normal and disaster-related aid inflows from consumption. Table 8 shows that all variables remain significant at the 1% level, while R squares substantially increase to, e.g., 0.33 for gross savings. Also, the size of the coefficients in four instances increases above 1. Yet, adding in capital stock losses does not help with explaining consumption changes and actually diminish the quality of the regression (e.g., from 33%
to 28% explained variation for gross savings). We also analyze the effect of revising for aid by subtracting aid from consumption (see Table 9 ), and results do not change substantially, neither for the unadjusted nor genuine savings indicators, indicating that regular and post event aid in this sample does not lead to substantial changes in welfare post-disaster. 
Low income group
Finally, we turn to assessing events in low income countries only. As expected, best results in terms of explaining consumption changes by savings measures are arrived at, and on table 10 we report sample information below for the group of sudden hydrometeorological events. To start with, while the savings measures are all highly significant, coefficients increase to above 1. Overall, the statistically explained variation also increases substantially to, e.g., a R square of 0.42 for gross savings. Then, most interestingly, the disaster adjustment finally makes a difference and the explained variation increases by about 1%, 2.5% and 4.5% for gross savings, net savings and genuine savings, respectively. Best results are still obtained when using the conventional gross savings measure. Further revising for aid inflows improves regression results slightly and increments in explanatory power are 3%, 4% and 5.5% respectively (see table II-4). It is important to remember that due to a lack of genuine savings and consumption data, a number of highly vulnerable countries, such as disaster-prone Caribbean countries (e.g., St. Lucia, which in 1988 experienced the largest ever loss as compared to national income) are not considered in this data set, which may improve the results in terms of explained variation with and without accounting for disaster shocks.
We tentatively conclude that for this group of low income countries and events, produced capital, and thus losses therein, play a stronger role in explaining consumption changes; furthermore, disasters losses seem to have a small adverse impact on consumption streams, although the disaster loss variable is again highly non-significant.
To provide a graphical impression of these relationships, on Figure 6 , we chart out gross disaster savings vs. the present value of changes in consumption for this sample. Further focusing in on this sample, such as separately studying flood and storm events, is not reliably possible, as, e.g., only 20 flood, 13 storm and two wet mass movement events remain for this income group.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
There is an ongoing debate on whether disasters cause significant macroeconomic impacts and are truly a potential impediment to economic development. The discussion is almost exclusively focused on impacts on GDP. We suggested that, as disasters, inter alia, destroy capital stocks, there may be important medium-longer term welfare effects in terms of consumption opportunities foregone as a consequence of reduced produced capital accumulation. Taking a longer term perspective (5 up to 33 years after an event)
we examined welfare changes in consumption potentially caused by the loss of capital stock; we hypothesized that, if indeed those existed, national savings measures adjusted for disaster asset losses should better explain changes in post disaster consumption streams. 21 Overall, we tentatively conclude that adjusting savings for disaster effects helps in better explaining post-disaster changes in welfare, yet mostly for the low income group of countries. Furthermore, the estimated effect is rather small. For the whole sample, and the combined medium and low income groups, disaster capital stock loss adjustments to savings does not reliably lead to improvements in explaining post disaster consumption changes. Also, losses by themselves do not significantly explain changes in consumption, probably due to the small size of the effect and the many other pressures on consumption.
Furthermore, sudden onset events, and here floods and storms, perform best which can be attributed to the fact that sudden onset events predominantly destroy assets, whereas slow onset events such as droughts or extreme temperature incidences rather lead to longer term indirect effects, which are not well picked up by the savings measure focusing on accounting for investments into capital stock. Furthermore, switching from gross savings to genuine savings mostly does not improve results in this regard. This result, somewhat at odds with theory and empirical work, can be explained by the flexible time horizon adopted. When using the fixed 15 year time horizon, indeed genuine savings measures better explain the consumption changes than gross and net savings do. Accordingly, our analysis is not to be understood as aiming to shed more light on the debate whether genuine savings better explain consumption changes, but rather whether adjusting disaster "depreciation" helps improve the explanatory power of savings measures
generally.
An implication of our work may be that accounting for disaster asset losses in savings measures for disaster-exposed, low income countries may help better explain variations in post-disaster consumption changes and thus adjusting alternative welfare indicators (negatively) leads to improved predictability of future post-disaster consumption changes. For some highly disaster exposed and vulnerable countries it may be worthwhile to explore using such further refined measures when planning policy, also given the increasing availability of country-wide risk estimates and savings indicators.
Overall, however, we have to acknowledge the small size of the sample and the fact that data exhibit important constraints hindering us to reasonably go beyond tentative conclusions. A key bottleneck has been the limited number of observations, mainly due to a lack of genuine savings data for a number of highly vulnerable countries, such as for 22 many disaster-prone Caribbean countries (e.g., St. Lucia, which in 1988 experienced the largest ever loss as compared to national income). This lack of data for countries expected to be particularly vulnerable to natural hazards may have lead to an important bias in the analysis. Consequently, we might expect our findings to improve if more observations are added. Constructing a more comprehensive and detailed database of disaster losses and savings measures may help to some extent with better addressing this problem, yet, by definition, the study of extreme events will always be constrained by scarce and imprecise data. 
